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Abstract
Understanding how observers attribute intentionality to people in the focus of their atten-
tion helps in shedding light on punishment behavior. In this paper we approach impartial
observers’ attributions of intentionality and the attachment of praise and blame to perpe-
trators of external e￿ects. In line with ￿ndings of Joshua Knobe (Knobe, 2003, 2006) ,
we argue that intentionality attributions to these perpetrators are more likely, if observers
consider the externality as morally bad instead of good. Due to this asymmetry, people
punish the perpetrators of negative externalities more severely than they reward those of
positive ones. In this paper we extend this explanation of the praise-blame bias by argu-
ing that not only moral considerations but also the information setting of perpetrators of
externalities are taken into account by observers. To that end, we analyze the answers to
vignettes of 240 undergraduate students of Friedrich Schiller University of Jena. We take
advantage of ordinary least square, logistic, and multinomial-logistic regression models to
predict increases in chances to attribute intentionality and to attach praise or blame. We
show that the awareness of, and the caring for, information related to the side e￿ects of
actions crucially a￿ect the judgments of impartial observers.
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Peter has just crashed his car into a ￿replug, trying not to kill the neighbor’s daughter who
suddenly jumped on the street. The spilling water disgorges onto the car of Mr. Miller who
has recently bought it, damaging it completely.
A challenging question would be how to judge the consequences. Peter deserves praise for
not hurting the daughter, though he might deserve blame for destroying the ￿replug. But
can he be held responsible, hence liable for wrecking Mr. Millers’ car? Pizarro et al. (2003)
argue that the ascription of moral responsibility is only possible if the cause, the intention,
and the outcome of an action are observable. As responsibility needs to be determined,
blame and praise are attached to Peter or any other perpetrator. The level of blame and
praise would be attenuated, if the described proper link between the intent and the act is
obscure. Examining the intentionality behind Peter’s crash helps the judgment process.
Indeed, accessing the intentionality facilitates the prediction and explanation of behavior
and contributes to the perception of the social world (Maselli and Altrocchi, 1969; Bratman,
1987). Hence, investigating the underlying principles of the concept of intentionality helps
to better understand how and why people punish or reward (Knobe, 2006).
Judgments are handed down mainly by legal institutions. From the perspective of the
law, the attribution of intentionality matters when ￿xing, e.g., sentences for murder or
manslaughter (Huang, 2000). Intentionality attribution and the attachment of blame and
praise also matter in a practical sense, e.g., in the assessment of ethical medical action
(La Jansen and Fogel, 2010). In economics the intentionality of actions is analyzed mainly
in fairness and reciprocity settings. Some models assume fairness intentions to be be-
haviorally irrelevant as long as relative outcomes re￿ect fairness themselves (Bolten and
Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Some others postulate a major behavioral role
for fairness intentions: the perceived kindness is considered the primary motivation for
non-payo￿ maximizing behavior (Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk
and Fischbacher, 2006). However, evidence is mixed, as there are results showing that
negative intentions matter (Blount, 1995; Charness and Rabin, 2002, 2005; Charness and
Levine, 2007) or do not matter (Bolten et al., 1998).
The considerations of intentionality a￿ecting judgments of observers who do not directly
interact with perpetrators of externalities are barely investigated in the experimental eco-
nomic literature. Even though, Barr and Serra (2009) show that the consideration of a
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to what extent the moral evaluation or information set a￿ected the intentionality attribu-
tion as well as the attachment of praise and blame.
Thompson (1991) suggests a positive impact of information on judgment accuracy, supple-
menting negotiation outcomes. In this light, we explore how the perception of information
awareness and the caring for information revealing the impact of actions a￿ect judgment
behavior.
In section 2, we describe a disparity between the levels of praise and blame attached and
present models explaining this e￿ect. It is furthermore suggested that while observers
are forming judgments they are a￿ected not only by moral considerations but also by the
information setting of the perpetrators of externalities. That is, we approach the question
of how failing to consider possible externalities of actions is judged by impartial observers.
The experimental design investigating this issue is presented in section 3. Our results,
presented in section 4, are subsequently discussed in section 5.
2 Disparity between Praise and Blame
2.1 Di￿erences in intentionality attributions
A frequently reported ￿nding is that observers tend to blame perpetrators who have caused
negative externalities more than they reward perpetrators who caused positive externalities
(Walster, 1966; Shaver, 1970, 1985). This asymmetry corresponds to a ￿nding by Knobe
(2003a), stating that observers attribute considerably more intentionality to perpetrators
of externalities considered bad rather than good. This is supported by Adams (1986) and
McCann (1986), who suggest that the intuition to judge actions is indeed in￿uenced by
the moral status of the externality-causing action.
Similar to the respective literature (Knobe, 2003a, 2004, 2006; Leslie et al., 2006; Knobe
and Burra, 2006; Cushman and Mele, 2006; Mele and Cushman, 2007), we refer to this
e￿ect as the ￿Side-E￿ect E￿ect￿ (SEE)
SEE: The action causing a negative externality is considered more likely as intended than
one causing a positive externality.
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to morally bad and positive externalities to morally good evaluations of choices causing
them. The key ￿nding is that people attribute intentionality with a higher propensity if
the choice causing the externality is considered morally bad than if it is considered morally
good. However, this might not hold if impartial observers had the chance to evaluate the
moral quality of the externality-causing choice.
If the SEE depends on the moral categorization of good and bad (Knobe, 2003a, 2006), it
should not occur in observers considering the choice causing an externality as neither good
nor bad. We refer to the latter as ‘not morally imputed observers’. 1 Therefore, we argue
that
H1: Morally imputed observers attribute intentionality with higher propensity than not
morally imputed observers.
While H1 links the subjective moral evaluations to intentionality, the link to judgments,
i.e., praise and blame, is discussed in the next section.
2.2 SEE and the disparity in the attachment of praise and blame
Consider the following commonly assumed mechanism for judgment behavior (Adams,
1986): subjects observe the externality of an action, judge whether it was caused inten-
tionally or not, subsequently access the morality of the action causing it, and then attach
praise or blame to the perpetrator. The chance to attribute intentionality would be inde-
pendent of moral considerations. Hence, it would be the same for positive and negative
externalities. Subsequently, the moral evaluation would only determine whether to attach
praise or blame. While such a mechanism provides the foundations for why an observer
praises and blames at all, it cannot explain the observed asymmetry of more blame than
praise. This would require variability in at least one explaining factor causing the di￿erence
in the level of praise and blame.
Knobe (2003b, 2004, 2006) postulated a mechanism capable of handling this issue: ob-
servers of externalities ￿rst consider the moral quality of the action, subsequently attribut-
ing intentionality to the perpetrator causing it, and ￿nally attaching praise or blame to
1Here we refer to Turner (2004), who claims that there is an intentionality attribution bias even in
the absence of moral asymmetry. Hence, we add the hypothesis that without the moral stimulus, the
attribution of intentionality should be equally distributed between helping and harming scenarios.
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which, in turn, a￿ects the level of praise, respectively blame, which is attached to exter-
nalities considered as morally good, respectively bad. The disparity in the levels of praise
and blame is therefore related to di￿erences in the moral evaluation of externalities.
Consider an externality evaluated as morally bad by an impartial observer. If she believes
that it was done intentionally, then she will sanction the perpetrator by attaching blame.
Hence, we argue that the higher the chance of attributing intentionality, the higher the
level of the blame attached. This mechanism is essentially the same for externalities con-
sidered as morally good. However, the di￿erence to externalities considered as morally
bad originates in a level shift of intentionality attributions and, hence, in the level shift of
praise attached.
The disparity between the levels of praise and blame attached is the subject of a large
body of literature, especially in psychology. Motivational reasons to justify more blaming
are given, e.g., by Walster (1966), who claims that the strive to avoid a similar fate or an
accident occurring to the observer drives the disparity. Similarly, Shaver (1970) suggests,
along the moral and legal traditions, that with more severe outcomes, a higher demand
for restitution and assigned punishment can be justi￿ed. In that line of argumentation
Tennen and A￿eck (1990), within the framework of ￿attribution theory￿ propose that
with more severe outcomes, the need to explain such events increases, shifting the focus of
attention to the blameworthy issues. There are also non-motivational reasons why blaming
is more pronounced than praising. Brewer (1977) argues that di￿erences in responsibility
attribution originate from di￿erences in the probabilities of these events - where negative
outcomes occur less likely than positive ones and, hence, deserve closer consideration by
attributing more responsibility to them.
Similar to Shaver (1985), we claim that
H2-1: the higher the propensity to attribute intentionality, the more praise, respectively
blame, is attached.
If evaluations reported as morally good or bad go along with higher chances to attribute
intentionality, compared to evaluations reported as neither morally good nor bad, as sug-
gested in section 2.1, this should also hold for the level of praise or blame attached.
H2-2: Morally imputed observers attach more praise (blame) to perpetrators of positive
(negative) externalities than non-imputed observers.
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Since the evaluation is made after the perpetrator has caused an externality, impartial
observers need to take the information set of the perpetrators into account. Were per-
petrators aware of, and did they care for, the consequences of their actions? Malle and
Knobe (1997) argue that being aware of a side e￿ect is a necessary condition to attribute
intentionality.
Furthermore, caring for consequences seems to play a role in attributing intentionality as
well as praise or blame (Pellizzoni et al., 2009a,b). As shown by Nichols and Ulatowski
(2007), observers who did not attribute intentionality to a perpetrator of positive exter-
nalities typically claimed this was because ￿he didn’t care￿ or ￿he didn’t show a motive
to help￿ the environment [p.4]. Leslie et al. (2006) demonstrate in experiments with 3-5
year-olds that the SEE is apparent only if the children understand that the perpetrator
does not care about the consequences. Pellizzoni et al. (2009b) ￿nds evidence that not
caring for negative side e￿ects increases tendencies to attribute intentionality. However,
if side e￿ects were caused, but perpetrators signaled they cared for revealing information,
we suggest adjustments in the tendency to attribute intentionality
Therefore, we extend Knobes initial claim by proposing that the evaluation of an action
is indeed a process that combines the moral evaluation of the externality, the perceived
awareness of its side e￿ects, and the evaluation of the caring for such information by
perpetrators.
We propose the following direct e￿ects of awareness and caring on chances to attribute
intentionality:
H3: perpetrators’ awareness of the side e￿ects increases the propensity of observers to
attribute intentionality.
If the side e￿ect caused turns out to be
H4-1: positive caring increases the propensity to attribute intentionality.
H4-2: negative caring decreases the propensity to attribute intentionality.
if the side e￿ect caused turns out to be
H5-1: positive non-caring decreases the propensity to attribute intentionality
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Concerning judgments, we propose that
H6: awareness and caring a￿ect the levels of praise and blame attached.
Furthermore, we expect awareness and caring to have a direct e￿ect on the moral evaluation
of the perpetrator’s action by the observer:
H7: the perceived awareness of externalities reinforces the moral impetus.
H8: accessing available information about externalities is perceived as a caring act (no
norm breaking), reinforcing the moral impetus.
H9: not accessing available information about externalities is perceived as a non-caring
act (norm breaking), reinforcing the moral impetus.
Of course, we expect indirect e￿ects of awareness and caring and will discuss those in the
subsequent sections.
Hence, the main contribution of this paper is our claim that the attribution of intentionality
is a￿ected by the negligence of information that could reveal possible externalities to the
perpetrator. We expect that actively not accessing information is perceived as more (less)
blameworthy (praiseworthy) as not being in the possession of relevant information while
implementing the action to cause a negative (positive) externality. In our experiment, we
ask how the negligence to foresee consequences is judged by impartial observers.
3 The Experiment
3.1 Information treatments
The dominant method to test the Side-e￿ect E￿ect are vignette experiments (Knobe, 2003a;
Nadelho￿er, 2004). Therefore, we use vignette designs similar to those of (Knobe, 2003a,
2006), presenting situations to be judged by impartial observers.
￿The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and said, ’We are
thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase pro￿ts, but it will also harm the
environment.’ The chairman of the board answered, ’I don’t care at all about harming the
6
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They started the new program. Sure enough, the environment was harmed.￿ (Knobe,
2006, p.205-206).
We refer to this negative externality story as ￿full information treatment￿.
To approach the question of the e￿ect of information awareness, we need to compare a
situation in which the perpetrator either has information about externalities to one where
she has no information. To approach how caring for information a￿ects the judgments,
we need to compare a situation where caring is possible to one where it is not. The e￿ect
of not caring for information on the judgments of observers is revealed by comparing a
situation of information negligence to one where no information is available at all.
Figure 1 presents all information treatment vignettes using the harming story. To repre-
sent positive externalities the vignettes can be easily transformed into helping stories by
replacing ￿harm￿ with ￿help￿ .
No information treatment:
￿The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and said, ’We are thinking
of starting a new program. It will help us increase pro￿ts. We don’t know whether it will help or
harm the environment. We cannot access this information by acquiring an expert report.’ The
chairman of the board answered, ’I don’t care at all about harming the environment. I just want
to make as much pro￿t as I can. Let’s start the new program.’ They started the new program.
Sure enough, the environment was harmed.￿
Don’t buy information treatment:
￿The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and said, ’We are thinking
of starting a new program. It will help us increase pro￿ts. We don’t know whether it will help or
harm the environment. However, we can access this information by acquiring an expert report.’
The chairman of the board answered, ’I don’t care at all about harming the environment, don’t
buy the report. I just want to make as much pro￿t as I can. Let’s start the new program.’ They
started the new program. Sure enough, the environment was harmed.￿
Buy information treatment:
￿The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and said, ’We are thinking
of starting a new program. It will help us increase pro￿ts. We don’t know whether it will help or
harm the environment. However, we can access this information by acquiring an expert report.’
The chairman of the board answered, ’I do care about helping or harming the environment. Buy
the report.’ The expert report shows that the environment will be harmed. Having read it, the
chairman stated ‘I just want to make as much pro￿t as I can. Let’s start the new program.’ They
started the new program. Sure enough, the environment was harmed.￿
Figure 1: Information treatment vignettes
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the perceived awareness of the externality, and the intuition of how perpetrators care for
information by either willingly accessing it or not, are displayed in table 1. This allows us
to clearly distinguish between the e￿ects of information awareness and the motive to care
for relevant information.
P(int)= Evaluation + Awareness + Caring
Full information + + 0
Positive No information + 0 0
externality Don’t buy information + 0 -
Buy information + + +
Full information ++ + 0
Negative No information ++ 0 0
externality Don’t buy information ++ 0 +
Buy information ++ + -
￿+￿: increasing, ￿-￿: decreasing, ￿0￿: no e￿ect
Table 1: Information treatments and the propensity to attribute intentionality
3.2 Experimental procedure
In total, 240 undergraduate students of Jena University with a background in the natural
and social sciences took part in our experiment. They were recruited by the use of ORSEE
(Greiner, 2004) and assigned to Internet-based vignettes, which were programmed using
LimeSurvey (Schmitz, 2009). Sixty students participated in each information treatment.
Half of them ￿rst received the positive externality vignettes and, subsequently, the negative
ones, the other half vice versa.
First, we approached subjects by asking for their moral evaluation of the chairman’s deci-
sion, allowing to state ￿morally good￿, ￿morally bad￿, or ￿neither nor.￿ Second, they were
asked to state whether the chairman intentionally helped, respectively harmed, the en-
vironment. Third, on a seven-item Likert Scale, subjects were asked to attribute either
a level of praise or, respectively, blame, to the perpetrator of the externality. After the
positive and the negative vignettes, a short questionnaire about the socioeconomic status
was presented to the subjects. On average, they needed less than ten minutes to complete
the experiment. In each treatment two subjects where randomly chosen and awarded 25; 
¿each.
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4.1 Intentionality attributions
Across all moral evaluations per treatment comparably more observers assigned intention-
ality to the perpetrators if the externality was negative rather than positive. The results
shown in table 2 support the SEE.
Note that externalities that, from the authors’ perspective, are assumed to be positive
were indeed more often rated as ￿morally bad￿ rather than ￿good.￿ For externalities a
priori assumed to be negative, the reversed pattern does not occur.
Positive externality Negative externality
Intentional Not intentional Intentional Not intentional
Morally good 20 45 4 6
Morally bad 4 104 108 83
Neither nor 3 64 15 24
Total 27 213 127 113
Table 2: Frequencies of intentionality attributions and moral evaluations by externalities
We control for the signi￿cance of these results with logistic regressions for the attribution of
intentionality, that is, for moral evaluations, order e￿ects, and the information treatments
(see table 3). Chances to attribute intentionality signi￿cantly increased, namely by 7.326
times, when observers indeed considered the positive externality as morally good and not
as neither morally good nor bad. On the other side, when observers indeed considered
negative exernalities as morally bad, the chance to attribute intentionality signi￿cantly
increased, namely by 2.241 times.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Morally good 7.326 7.326 7.326 1.042 1.042 1.042
(5.042) (5.042) (5.042) (0.782) (0.782) (0.782)
Morally bad 1.018 1.018 1.018 2.241 2.241 2.241
(0.853) (0.853) (0.853) (0.835) (0.835) (0.835)
Praise ￿rst 0.780 0.780 0.780 0.494 0.494 0.494
(0.353) (0.353) (0.353) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135)
Full information 0.989 0.404 0.308 2.671 1.319 0.837
(0.978) (0.327) (0.218) (1.028) (0.503) (0.323)
No information 0.408 0.312 0.494 0.313
(0.359) (0.281) (0.190) (0.122)
Don’t buy information 2.451 0.764 2.024 0.634
(2.155) (0.531) (0.778) (0.244)
Buy information 3.207 1.309 3.192 1.577
(2.893) (0.910) (1.245) (0.606)
Observations 240 240 240 240 240 240
McFadden’s R2 0.204 0.204 0.204 0.067 0.067 0.067
Exponentiated coe￿cients; Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:10,
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
Table 3: Logistic Regressions for attributing intentionality
That is, given that observers evaluate actions as good, respectively bad, they tend to
attribute intentionality with a higher propensity than if they evaluate the actions as neither
morally good nor bad. Hence, this lends further support to the hypothesis that moral
considerations a￿ect intentionality attributions (H1).
4.2 Intentionality and the attribution of praise and blame
For all treatments we observe signi￿cantly higher average levels of blame than praise,
indicating a disparity between the intensities of judging externalities as either positive
(praise) or negative (blame) (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for all treatments p < 0:001).
Approaching our second hypothesis, we investigate the relation of attributed intentionality
and the level of praise and blame attached, respectively. The corresponding correlations can
be seen in table 4. As shown, higher frequencies of intentionality attributions correspond
to higher levels of praise or blame attached.
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Positive externalities Praise For negative externalities Blame
Intentionality for positive externalities 1.00
Level of praise 0.47*** 1.00
Intentionality for negative externalities 0.12** 0.03 1.00
Level of blame 0.10 0.06 0.36*** 1.00
*(p < 0:1), **(p < 0:05), ***(p < 0:001)
Table 4: Cross-correlation of intentionality and the level of attachment of praise and blame
We further support this claim by using ordinary least squares regression models (table 5). 2
Given the 7 point Likert scale, these models show that subjects attach signi￿cantly more
praise and blame (1.5 , respectively, 1 points more), if intentionality is attributed. This
supports our hypothesis (H2-1).
Compared to those subjects evaluating the externality causing action as morally neither
good nor bad, the e￿ect of moral considerations can be revealed. Given the positive exter-
nality was indeed evaluated as ￿morally good" the amount of praise signi￿cantly increases
by 0.829 points. If it is evaluated as morally bad, the amount of praise signi￿cantly de-
creases by 0.559 points. On the negative externality side, the amount of blame increases
signi￿cantly by 0.936 points, if it is indeed evaluated as ￿morally bad￿. Hence, on top of the
e￿ect of intentionality attributions, the moral impetus signi￿cantly a￿ects the attachment
of praise and blame, supporting our claim (H2-2).
Note, we do observe a signi￿cant order e￿ect. Subjects tend to attach more praise if they
were confronted with the helping scenario, ￿rst. However, our models explain 49.9 %
respectively 19.3% of the observed variance of praise and blame attached, providing solid
ground for our model.
2We estimated ordered logit models, too. These did not show any systematic di￿erence compared to the
OLS models. We checked the OLS-regressions for nonlinearity, heteroskedasticity and multicollinearity.
None of these e￿ects were present.
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(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Intentionally positive 1.461 1.461 1.461 0.925 0.925 0.925
(0.267) (0.267) (0.267) (0.182) (0.182) (0.182)
Morally good 0.829 0.829 0.829 0.613 0.613 0.613
(0.238) (0.238) (0.238) (0.477) (0.477) (0.477)
Morally bad -0.559 -0.559 -0.559 0.936 0.936 0.936
(0.203) (0.203) (0.203) (0.238) (0.238) (0.238)
Praise ￿rst 0.766 0.766 0.766 -0.0834 -0.0834 -0.0834
(0.156) (0.156) (0.156) (0.176) (0.176) (0.176)
Full information -0.0232 -0.250 -0.959 0.0122 0.00353 -0.290
(0.229) (0.225) (0.250) (0.248) (0.247) (0.245)
No information -0.227 -0.936 -0.00866 -0.302
(0.220) (0.279) (0.248) (0.249)
Don’t buy information 0.227 -0.709 0.00866 -0.294
(0.220) (0.268) (0.248) (0.246)
Buy information 0.936 0.709 0.302 0.294
(0.279) (0.268) (0.249) (0.246)
Constant 1.566 1.792 2.502 2.884 2.893 3.187
(0.228) (0.218) (0.237) (0.282) (0.285) (0.293)
Observations 240 240 240 240 240 240
R2 0.499 0.499 0.499 0.193 0.193 0.193
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:10,
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
Table 5: OLS for amount of blame and praise
4.3 E￿ects of information sets
4.3.1 E￿ects on intentionality attributions
We introduced our information sets in order to disentangle the e￿ect of information aware-
ness from the e￿ect of caring for available information on the intentionality attribution.
All results concentrate on the observers evaluating positive externalities as morally good
and negative externalities as morally bad.3
3Note that observers evaluating positive (negative) externalities as morally bad (good) do not di￿er
signi￿cantly from the baseline group of observers evaluating externalities as neither morally good nor bad.
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Full information 7.326*** 0.989 0
Positive No information 7.326*** 0 0
externality Don’t buy information 7.326*** 0 2.451
Buy information 7.326*** 0.308*
Full information 2.241** 2.671** 0
Negative No information 2.241** 0 0
externality Don’t buy information 2.241** 0 2.024*
Buy information 2.241** 0.837
p < 0:10,
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
Table 6: Summary of odds ratios to attribute intentionality
Awareness
Table 6 summarizes those odds ratios of table 3 highlighting the di￿erent treatments and
their impact on intentionality while controlling for moral evaluations and order e￿ects.
Comparing rows ￿full information￿ and ￿no information￿ reveals the impact of information
awareness. Hence, for positive externalities the column ￿awareness￿ shows that there is no
signi￿cant di￿erence in the probability to attribute intentionality, whether or not perpe-
trators had information about consequences or not. Contrarily, for negative externalities,
taking into account that perpetrators were aware of information about their actions’ con-
sequences signi￿cantly increases the likelihood of observers to attribute intentionality to
the former by 2.671 times.
Caring
The e￿ect of caring for information can be unraveled by comparing treatments ￿full infor-
mation￿ to ￿buy information.￿ Note that ￿buy information￿ implies that the perpetrator is
aware of the information but indeed cared for acquiring it. For the positive externality the
estimator expresses that chances to attribute intentionality to its perpetrators signi￿cantly
increase by 3.246 times if they cared for buying information instead of not doing so. 4 We
argue that caring signals a motive for actively yielding the externality, which is rewarded
by more intentionality attribution, even after controlling for moral evaluation and order
e￿ects.
For negative externalities the chance to attribute intentionality to their perpetrator does
not signi￿cantly increase if information was actively accessed. Contrary to positive ex-
ternalities, even a signal of caring for actively yielding the negative externalities does not
imply higher chances to attribute intentionality. We relate this to already high levels of
4To allow for consistent interpretations we compare ￿buy info￿ to ￿full info￿ instead of ￿full information￿
to ￿buy information￿. Hence, the odds ratio only needs to be inverted (1/0.308).
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The e￿ect of not caring for information, i.e., neglecting it, can be seen by comparing
the ￿no information￿ treatment to the ￿don’t buy￿ information treatment. In the positive
externality case, neglecting information does not signi￿cantly increase the chance of inten-
tionality attribution. Put di￿erently, the signal of not caring for information would not
a￿ect intentionality attributions if the externality turned out to be positive.
However, for negative externalities the chances to attribute intentionality would increase by
2.024 times if perpetrators neglected information. In other words, the signal of not caring
for information on consequences of actions increases intentionality attributions. This is
true even after controlling for moral evaluations and order e￿ects.
4.3.2 Direct e￿ects on praise and blame attached
Concerning our hypothesis H6, we do not ￿nd support for a direct e￿ect of information
awareness, respectively caring for information, on the levels of praise and blame attached,
with one exception. Being aware of information on the externality does not increase the
amount of praise if the externality is positive, respectively does not increase the amount of
blame attached if the externality is negative (see table 5). Interestingly, this implies that
for negative externalities not knowing is no excuse for not being blamed.
The exception regards caring for information. With an increase of 0.959 points signi￿cantly
more praise is attached to perpetrators actively acquiring information - compared to those
merely in possession of the information on the consequences of their action without actively
acquiring it. This implies that praise is attached for signaling to care for the consequences
of actions if the externality turns out to be positive. We do not observe higher amounts
of blame, if caring motives are revealed by purchasing information and if the externality is
negative.
The negligence of information does not a￿ect the level of praise or blame for positive,
respectively negative, externalities. In the case of negative externalities, the amount of
blame is as high if information is neglected as if it was not available at all. This result
supports the saying that ignorance is no excuse in law.
4.3.3 E￿ects on moral evaluations
Observers could evaluate positive externalities, e.g., as morally good, as morally bad, or
as neither morally good nor bad. We assume that observers stating no moral category
(a ￿neither morally good nor bad￿ statement) can serve as a reference group to which
observers that evaluate externalities as good or bad can be compared. With this reference
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observers with a moral impetus, as suggested by our hypotheses.
With respect to positive externalities, table 7 displays how awareness of, and caring for,
information a￿ect the moral evaluation of observers with a moral impetus compared to
those without it. As shown by this comparison, the pure e￿ect of awareness signi￿cantly
decreased the chance of morally imputed observers to evaluate a positive externality as
morally bad by 0.218 times.
Positive externality Negative externality
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Morally good
Full information 1.286 1.178 0.500 0.244
(0.880) (0.707) (0.656) (0.289)
No information 0.777 0.916 2.001 0.488
(0.532) (0.696) (2.627) (0.464)
Don’t buy information 1.092 0.849 2.050 4.103
(0.830) (0.509) (1.948) (4.860)
Buy information 7.265 5.647 6.652 0.900 1.801 0.439
(4.769) (2.608) (3.782) (0.991) (2.357) (0.415)
Praise ￿rst 1.823 1.823 1.823 0.697 0.697 0.697
(0.709) (0.709) (0.709) (0.505) (0.505) (0.505)
Morally bad
Full information 0.218 0.346 1.021 1.390
(0.0980) (0.147) (0.523) (0.688)
No information 4.581 1.587 0.980 1.362
(2.057) (0.726) (0.502) (0.674)
Don’t buy information 0.630 2.887 0.734 0.720
(0.288) (1.226) (0.364) (0.356)
Buy information 0.0150 0.0686 0.0238 0.882 0.864 1.201
(0.0163) (0.0736) (0.0256) (0.443) (0.434) (0.581)
Praise ￿rst 1.993 1.993 1.993 1.088 1.088 1.088
(0.686) (0.686) (0.686) (0.383) (0.383) (0.383)
Observations 240 240 240 240 240 240
McFadden’s R2 0.243 0.243 0.243 0.015 0.015 0.015
Exponentiated coe￿cients; Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:10,
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
Table 7: Mulinomial logistic regressions for moral evaluation
In contrast to observers without a moral impetus, the e￿ect of caring signi￿cantly increased
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good by 5.647 times. This ￿nding suggests that caring for information directly a￿ects the
chance to evaluate a positive externality as morally good. Contrarily, the chance of morally
imputed observers to evaluate positive externalities as morally bad signi￿cantly decreased
by 0.0686 times.
We do not ￿nd any e￿ects of not caring for information on the chances to evaluate positive
externalities as either morally good or bad. For the case of negative externalities evalu-
ated as morally good or bad by morally imputed observers, we do not ￿nd any e￿ects of
information. This implies that additional facts on awareness of, or caring for, information,
do not directly a￿ect the moral evaluations if the externality is negative.
5 Conclusion
Based on the experiment presented here, we ￿nd support for the SEE hypothesis stating
that intentionality is more likely to be attributed to choices causing negative externalities
than to choices causing positive ones. Allowing for self-evaluations of such choices, we
observe that observers indeed consider positive externalities as morally bad or even neg-
ative externalities as morally good. This points to the importance of not presupposing
moral judgments but explicitly asking for them. If observers are indeed morally imputed,
negative externalities are more likely to be attributed as intentionally caused than positive
externalities.
We ￿nd a high and signi￿cant correlation between intentionality attributions and the levels
of praise and blame attached. Intentionality attributions a￿ect the levels of praise and
blame as suggested by our hypothesis (H2-1). On top of that, a moral impetus alters these
levels, as well, supporting our considerations (H2-2).
Having shown that there is indeed a disparity between intentionality attributions and their
e￿ect on the corresponding levels of praise and blame, we approached two plausible im-
pacts on intentionality: awareness of information and caring for the consequences of action
choices. By comparing a situation with information to a situation without information
about action choice consequences, we show that intentionality is signi￿cantly less likely at-
tributed if there is no information awareness by the perpetrator of a negative externality.
By comparing a situation where there already is information available to one where infor-
mation needs to be actively accessed, caring for the consequences of actions can be signaled.
In addition, accessing such information can be seen as adhering to a moral norm stating
that own action choice consequences should be taken into account (O￿erman, 2002). We
propose two possible e￿ects of caring on intentionality. The ￿rst e￿ect is transmitted in-
directly via the e￿ect of caring on the moral evaluation. The argument is that observed
16
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 041adherence to the moral norm in question reinforces the direction of the moral evaluation.
We ￿nd evidence for this claim in the case where perpetrators of positive externalities
care for information: the chances that observers evaluate the subsequent action choice as
￿morally good￿ increase signi￿cantly compared to cases where such caring is not possible.
In turn, the likelihood that intentionality is attributed also increases signi￿cantly. The
second e￿ect is revealed by controlling the e￿ects on intentionality for the moral evalua-
tions. Caring is a signi￿cant factor in the attribution of intentionality: it increases the
chance that observers attribute intentionality to perpetrators of positive externalities. The
argument here is that the signaling of caring for information increases the perceived like-
lihood that perpetrators intentionally chose the a particular action to cause the positive
externality. For negative externalities we do not ￿nd any e￿ects of caring on moral eval-
uations and intentionality attribution. Recklessness in the sense of assessing information
but not taking them into account cannot be outweighed by adhering to a moral norm nor
by signaling caring preferences.
If we contrast the situation where no information is available with one where information
is not accessed by perpetrators of externalities, we can assess the e￿ect of not caring on
intentionality attributions. Not caring for information is only signi￿cantly e￿ective in the
case of negative externalities. Contrary to the e￿ect of caring, it does not a￿ect observers’
moral evaluations of the chairman’s action. Therefore, it cannot have an indirect e￿ect
on the intentionality attribution. We suggest that, additionally, not adhering to the norm
of taking into account one’s choices cannot deteriorate the already bad moral evaluation
in the negative externality case. However, non-caring for information does have a direct
e￿ect on intentionality attributions. By not signaling a motive to care, the chances that
observers attribute intentionality are signi￿cantly higher than if no such signal is sent.
That is, the negligence of information leads to higher attributions of intentionality.
Obviously, non-caring does not signal a motive to care for the helping scenario. Hence,
it is clear that for positive externalities there is no signi￿cant direct e￿ect of non-caring
on intentionality attribution. Interestingly, breaking the norm to care for consequences of
own actions does not a￿ect the moral evaluations.
Adherence to norms in respect of positive externalities is rewarded by higher levels of
praise. Contrarily, an additional impetus of norm breaking (a non-caring act) on moral
evaluation does not lead to higher levels of blame. We argue that this originates from
already high levels of blame attached, supporting that negligence is as blameworthy as not
knowing.
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